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Abstract
This project presents a general framework of node monitorization for any compart-
mental epidemic model that operates on networks. This can be used to select which
nodes in a network should be monitored in order to detect an outbreak following
a specified model as fast as possible, make predictions about the current state of
the network given the observations of the sensed nodes and decide which nodes
should we test immediately after detecting the existence of an epidemic to maximize
information gain. In this work I formulate the problems analytically using Markov
Chains and propose Monte Carlo sampling algorithms to solve the problems in larger
graphs. Finally I illustrate the capabilities of the framework in experiments in two
real networks that exemplify two possible uses of the framework in real epidemic
scenarios.
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In this project I present my work at NYU during my academic stay from September
2019 to May 2020. The whole body of the project is presented as the scientific article
I wrote under the supervision of Carlos Fernández-Granda (NYU), Joan Bruna
(NYU) and Victor M. Preciado (UPenn), which is included below this introduction
and will appear as a preprint soon after the due date of this work. In this section I
provide a small higher level overview to the studied field to contextualize the article.
1.2 Introduction to epidemiology on networks
Mathematical modelling aims to simplify real systems while capturing fundamental
properties that can later be used to take decisions, predict outcomes, or, more
generally, increase our knowledge about the system. This work explores a tool that
can be used to increase the range of questions models of infectious processes can
answer.
The most obvious example of infectious processes are infectious diseases, which
are very relevant today as the spread of the virus SARS-CoV-2 is causing severe
disruptions in economy, public health and society. Mathematical modelling has
guided experts into taking measures in this and previous health emergencies, such as
Ebola and H1N1 influenza, and also to help eradicate diseases such as Guinea worm
and polio.
Various modelling approaches have been used in the field of epidemiology. Ranging
from compartmental models, in which population is assumed to be well-mixed,
to fully individual agent-based models in which the behaviour of every agent is
simulated, different models aim to describe different aspects of the disease evolution.
This huge set of models already available in the literature motivate the creation of
model-agnostic tools that could rapidly be used out of the box once domain experts
have decided which particular model is best used to describe a particular epidemic
outbreak. In this work, I present a model-agnostic tool for a subset of models:
Markovian models that act on networks. This means that a graph G = (V,E) is
assumed to be given, and then the infectious process affects nodes in the network
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
and travels along its edges. This spread can be stochastic, and the main objective
explored in the article is to detect the presence of such processes as fast as possible
by monitoring nodes in the network, and in the article I explore which nodes to test
and what information can this test give us.
Infectious processes in networks are not limited to infectious diseases. Some other
situations in which this framework would apply are the spreading of rumours or fake
news in social networks (both online and offline) and the spreading of a computer
virus in a network of computers with data transfer between them. For simplicity,
most of the notation used throughout will refer to the infectious disease case (i.e
nodes will be healthy infected, ...) as in the setup of infectious diseases, but it should
be understood that all of it applies to the other settings, in which for example an
infectious node could be someone who has heard of a false rumour and now is capable
of spreading it to its nearby contacts.
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ABSTRACT
We present a general framework of node monitorization for any compartmental epidemic model that
operates on networks, which can be used to select which nodes in a network should be monitored in
order to detect an outbreak following a specified model as fast as possible, make predictions about
the current state of the network given the observations of the sensed nodes and decide which nodes
should we test immediately after detecting the existence of an epidemic to maximize information gain.
We formulate the problems analytically using Markov Chains and propose Monte Carlo sampling
algorithms to solve the problems in larger graphs. We illustrate the capabilities of the framework in
experiments in two real networks that exemplify two possible uses of the framework in real epidemic
scenarios.
1 Introduction
Epidemic modelling has been the driving force in decision making in order to combat different infectious diseases such
as Ebola, H1N1 influenza and most recently Covid-19, and has also been a key factor to help eradicate diseases such as
Guinea worm and Polio. A huge amount of models exist with different sets of assumptions and attempting to answer
different questions. Since the diseases are spread via close contact between individuals only, networks can be used to
effectively encode the information of which individuals can directly infect which other ones, and the study of virus
propagation in networks has generated a lot of interest.
With the large amount of available epidemic models, most of which can be easily adapted to networks, the creation of a
common framework that does not assume a model beforehand and can answer a set of questions once the model is
specified is interesting for a variety of reasons. First of all, it can be used together with any existing modelling approach,
giving new insights that might not be obvious from the model alone at virtually no extra modelling cost. In that aspect,
the presence of a domain expert that can carefully chose the best model to study the particular situation is key. Secondly,
it can also be a useful tool to compare between possible models (or sets of parameters for a single model) that aim to
describe reality, as the predictions of the framework can then be compared to real data.
While significant effort has been put in the study of specific questions for different models in networks, such as
phase transitions [1] or epidemic thresholds [2], the kind of higher-level questions that a common framework for all
compartmental models could aim to solve has yet to be explored. As the evolution studied is inherently Markovian,
Markov Chains can been used as powerful tools that can help us solving some of the questions that motivate the creation
of the model [3]. Here, we propose a way to solve different problems related to the early stages of an epidemic with the
use of Markov Chains. In our setup, we are able to test individuals to detect the existence of an epidemic, whether this
disease is new or we want to monitor a new wave of a previous known disease, as it could be the case for Covid-19 as
containment measures start to be lifted. Broadly speaking, the most important questions explored in this article are (i)
which nodes should we monitor, (ii) what information would a detection in the monitored nodes give us, and (iii) what
nodes should we test next after an outbreak detection.
The main contributions of this work are the following: we present a framework with flexibility to model all kind of
compartmental models in networks and we formalize early detection problems in Markov Chain language. Then, we
prove a submodularity result for a general coverage-type set function in Markov Chains, and then use it to scale our
method to larger graphs, together with Monte Carlo like algorithms.
This article is organized as follows: In section 2, the background of previous literature is presented. In section 3, the
main setup for the framework and the questions that we aim to solve is explained. These questions are then rigorously
formalized and solved analytically in section 4. Section 5 provides insight into how to solve the problems in practice,
as the analytical solution is only usable for very small graphs. Finally, section 6 presents experiments in a toy small
network and two real networks in different situations to illustrate the capabilities of the framework.
2 Related Work
General work on stochastic compartmental model on networks include [4], [5], [6]. [7] provides a survey of problems
involving spreading processes in networks. More recently, [8] and [9] provide inference procedures with similar goals
as the one presented in this paper.
[3] studies the spread of computer viruses in network using Markov Chains in a similar way that we use them in this
work, albeit its focus is more on continuous time Markov Chain and the mean field approximations that can be derived
from them. [10] uses a similar sensor placement framework as in this work to detect outbreaks such as news spreading
or water contaminants with high generality. Here, our first problem is a similar problem but with a different objective
function more suited to epidemic spread. However, since our function has similar properties, their methods to scale up
greedy-like techniques can apply in this case as well.
Deciding which nodes to monitor is solving a group closeness like-problem, as it is trying to find central nodes in the
sense of early epidemic detection. [11] provides an introduction to the different types of flow processes (which include
epidemic processes) and how some of them define a closeness measure for nodes. Some work has been done for other
types of stochastic flow processes. For example, [12] proposes an algorithm to find nodes that can be reached quickly in
random walks over a graph, a problem that presents conceptual similarities to our first problem.
3 Setup: Epidemic, early detection and tracing problems
3.1 Markovian Epidemic Models
All of the questions that we aim to answer given a model correspond to the early stages of an epidemic. In this section
we define which kind of models are compatible with the framework and informally state these questions, which we will
revisit in the following section using Markov Chains to formalize them and obtain analytical solutions and more precise
statements. We consider a given network G = (V,E) with nodes numbered from 1 to n, and a compartmental infection
model satisfying the following properties:
1. The model operates in a network in discrete time-steps.
2. At every time-step, each of the nodes is in one of s possible states.
3. The state of the network (i.e of all its nodes) at time t+ 1 is a stochastic function of the state of the network at
time t only.
All classical, compartmental models adapted to networks and discrete-time satisfy these conditions. The simplest,
canonical example is given by the classical SIR model of 3 compartments: Susceptible, Infected and Removed [13].
At each time-step, infected nodes may infect healthy network neighbors with probability β and become removed (no
longer infectious) with probability γ, as seen schematically in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: SIR model adaptation to networks and discrete-time. The susceptible, infected and removed nodes are green,
red or blue respectively and the arrow colors indicate the possible next state of a node, achieved with probability equal
to the number above the arrow
Other examples of models satisfying the hypothesis include the SI (similar to SIR but infected nodes stay infected),
SIS (infected nodes become healthy again with probability γ, but they may get re-infected), the Reed-Frost model
(the infected individual may spread the disease during a fixed number of timesteps before getting cured) and any
compartmental model adapted to network and discrete time [14].
3.2 Sensor Placement and Epidemic Inference Tasks
We assume that we are able to place sensors, each of them letting us monitor the health status of a node in the network.
Therefore we can monitor the health of k nodes in the network as time progresses if we have k sensors. The first
question (Q1) is precisely related to the placement of these sensors, which can be solved “a priori”, before the outbreak.
The following questions (Q2-Q5) are “a posteriori” questions, implying that the some of the sensors have already
detected the infection, and they relate to the information that we can derive with that observation.
Q1A (Sensor placement with sensor budget): If we are given k sensors, where should we place sensors in a network
to be able to detect an outbreak fast with the highest probability possible? What is the probability of having detected
the infection fast enough?
Q1B (Sensor placement with time budget): If we are given an objective time in which we should detect the outbreak
with a fixed probability, what is the minimum amount of sensors that can achieve that objective? Where should we place
them?
The following questions assume that we have a (not necessarily optimal) solution for Q1, and that we have made a
sensor placement. We suppose that after some time of placing the sensors, one or more than one of the sensors signals
the infection of their nodes. What can we tell about the infection of the whole at this stage, conditioned to the fact that
we have observed that the first time that the infection reached the set of monitored nodes, it reached some specific
nodes? Q2 and Q3 ask what information do we have about the past, mostly about where and when the infection outbreak
began.
Q2 (Patient zero detection): Given our observation of the sensors, what is the probability of each initial status (for
example each node being patient zero)?
Q3 (Outbreak time estimation): Given our observation of the sensors, how much time has happened since the disease
started?
At the time of detection, we know the status of the monitored nodes only, and we want to understand how much
information we have about the current status of the rest of the network with the known information so far:
Q4 (Current status assessment): Given our observation of the sensors, what is the probability of each possible state
of the network? In particular, what is the probability that each individual node is infected?
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Finally, in these scenarios, we need to take action to gather more information as soon as possible. Q5 asks about the
optimal strategy for near future action. Suppose that after detecting the outbreak at T = t, we are given a budget of tests
to perform, Q5 asks about the testing strategy that maximizes the information about the current state of the network.
Q5 (Optimal testing after detection): Given the results of all the previous questions and a budget of tests, which
nodes should we test next?
The following section formalizes these tasks in terms of inferential queries in Markov Chains and provides an analytical
solution usable for small graphs only.
4 Theoretical formulation
In this section, we begin by transforming the epidemic models into Markov Chains, and them the five questions from
the previous section are formalized and solved analytically.
4.1 Definition of the Markov Chain
Under the three conditions from the previous sections, the epidemic model can be formulated as a Markov Chain of state
space S with |S| = sn and transition matrix according to model specifics. The Markov Chain codifies all n nodes in
the network, which can each be in the s different compartments. Additionally, a distribution over initial states D needs
to be given over the possible initial states of the outbreak. A reasonable choice for the SIR and similar compartmental
models with an infected state is that at the beginning of the infection, all nodes are healthy and one is infected, and
D becomes a distribution over the n nodes of them being patient zero. Henceforth all probabilities are assumed to be
conditioned on X0, the initial state of the Markov chain, coming from the distribution D.
4.2 Sensor placement optimization (Q1)
Out of the s possible states in which a node might be in the chosen model, we define beforehand which subset of states
is detectable by the sensor. Formally, we consider the s states divided in l ≤ s non-empty groups, G1, ..., Gl and the
sensor is able to determine the group of the current state only. For the case of l = s, this means that the sensor always
knows the exact state of the monitored node. A detectable state is then a state which is not in the same group as the
state of the population before the infection (susceptible, healthy or similar, depending on the model formalism).
For example, in the SIR model a natural choice is to choose the infected state as the only detectable (whether we choose
the removed state as detectable is irrelevant as nodes will always get infected before being removed) and think of the
sensor as a method of continued testing over one node that will detect whether the node is infected or not. The objective
is to choose the nodes that will be monitored in order to find a detectable state soon after an outbreak happens. In
the SIR model example, this means that the infection is detected by the sensors quickly. This notion of detecting the
infection is quantified by Markov Chains using hitting times:
Hitting Time: The hitting time of A ⊂ S, TA, is the random variable min{n ≥ 0 : Xn ∈ A}, where Xi ∈ S is the
state of the Markov Chain at time i. If the Markov Chain is absorbed in an absorbing state not in A, we set TA =∞.
Given a subset of nodes W ⊂ V , we also define the detection set of W , DW , as the subset of Markov Chain states S
consisting of those states in which at least one of the nodes in W is in a detectable state. We therefore have by definition
DW = ∪i∈WD{i}. This means that given a sensor placement in W , the group of sensors triggers when the Markov
Chain reaches one of the states of DW , although the exact state will still be unknown as some nodes are not monitored.
If we fix a set of nodes W ⊂ V = {1, ..., n}, then for a Markov Chain in which each node can be in s states, d of which
are detectable, we have
|DW | = sn − sn−|W |(s− d)|W | = sn−|W |(s|W | − (s− d)|W |) (1)
This comes from the fact that the states that are not part of DW are those in which the nodes in W are in one of the s−d
non-detectable state, and we don’t have any restriction over the rest. By direct counting, there are sn−|W |(s− d)|W | of
such states, so subtracting it from the total gives us the desired count for |DW |. We are therefore sending subsets of V
to subsets of S in a way in which the cardinality of the output set only depends on the cardinality of the input set. Since
we are only interested of the dynamics before the sensors trigger, we may consider all the states in the detection set as
absorbing states in the Markov Chain to calculate the corresponding hitting times.
Now, question Q1A can be formalized as follows: Given a time horizon τ , we want to place the k sensors in order to
maximize the probability of the Markov chain reaching the detection set in less or equal than τ steps since the epidemic
outbreak. Specifically, the optimal placement is given by
argmax
W⊂V,|W |=k
P (TDW ≤ τ) = argmax
W⊂V,|W |=k
P (Xτ ∈ DW ) (2)
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where we understand that DW acts as an absorbing set, and so if Xi ∈ DW for i < τ then Xτ ∈ DW . Similarly,




i.e, the smallest set of sensors that certify a probability larger than 1− ε to detect the epidemic in lesser or equal than τ
time-steps.
Computing Hitting Times: We can analytically calculate P (TDW ≤ τ) = P (TDW ≤ τ |TDW <∞)P (TDW <∞).
P (TDW <∞) refers to the probability of the Markov Process ending in an absorbing state in DW . Some models, such
as SIR, have absorbing states which represent the epidemic "dying" before any detection in the sensors (for example,
the first person gets cured before transmitting it to anyone), which might therefore not be part of DW . This probability
of ending in this group of states can be calculated from the fundamental matrix of the Markov Chain. To calculate
P (TDW ≤ τ |TDW <∞) we need to eliminate these other absorbing states in the chain, which we denote S−. Given
a Markov Chain with two sets of absorbing states S+ and S− and a transition matrix M , one can construct another
matrix M+ corresponding to the Markovian dynamics of those processes that get absorbed at S+ (which we can write
as X∞ ∈ S+), using the following derivation:
M+ij =P
(
Xt+1 = j|Xt = i,X∞ ∈ S+
)
=
P (Xt+1 = j|Xt = i)P (X∞ ∈ S+|Xt = i,Xt+1 = j)
P (X∞ ∈ S+|Xt = i)
=
P (Xt+1 = j|Xt = i)P (X∞ ∈ S+|X0 = j)
P (X∞ ∈ S+|X0 = i)
=Mij
P (X∞ ∈ S+|X0 = j)
P (X∞ ∈ S+|X0 = i)
(4)
Here, the quantities {P (X∞ ∈ S+|X0 = i)}i can be found from the fundamental matrix and if i is a
state in S−, or more generally if P (X∞ ∈ S+|X0 = i) = 0, state i will never be reached in the new
dynamics and we can safely eliminate it from the chain. This is a proper probability distribution as∑
jMijP (X∞ ∈ S+|X0 = j) = P (X∞ ∈ S+|X0 = i). The initial distribution also needs to be modified similarly,
with P (X0 = i|X∞ ∈ S+) ∝ P (X∞ ∈ S+|X0 = i)P (X0 = i).
Once we have a Markov Chain with the only set of absorbing states S+, the distribution of hitting times to S+ follows
a discrete phase-type distribution (provided that X0 6∈ S+). If we collapse all the states of S+ into one (by adding
the probabilities that reach it), the hitting times are unchanged and the transition matrix of the Markov Chain with Nt







Where Q is a Nt ×Nt matrix, R is a Nt × 1 vector that corresponds to the probabilities of absorption from each state,
and there are Nt zeros in the last row.
By definition we have R+Q~1 = ~1, where ~1 is the vector of all ones. In that case,
P(TS+ ≤ k) = P(TS+ > 0)(1− vQk~1) + P(TS+ = 0) , (6)
where v is the 1 × t vector of starting probabilities for states s 6∈ S+ (all conditioned to X∞ ∈ S+) divided by
1− P(TS+ = 0) = 1− P(X0 ∈ S+) so that the sum of the entries is 1. The full equation reads
P(TDW ≤ τ) = P(TDW <∞)P(TDW ≤ τ |TDW <∞)
























This objective function could thus be analytically computed if it was possible to operate with the matrix Q. This is






placements, which also makes it infeasible to solve the problem without a proper optimization scheme that avoids
computing the objective function for all possible placements. A similar problem will occur in the following questions.
To overcome these we rely on Monte Carlo simulations and submodularity function optimization results, which we
discuss in the following section.
4.3 A posteriori inference tasks (Q2, Q3, Q4)
From now on the following situation is assumed: We have sensors placed in a subset W of nodes of the network, with
|W | = k, and at the current time, at least one of them has detected a detectable state for the first time. The situation is
represented schematically in Figure 2. The state of the nodes with sensors is known to a certain degree, but the state of
nodes outside those is not determined a priori.
Figure 2: Example situation after sensor detection. Here green or red might mean a specific state or a group of states,
depending on the power of the sensors
We define a state of the Markov Chain to be compatible with our observation if in that state the sensed nodes are
in a state which agrees with the sensors. These include all possibilities for non-sensed nodes but may include some
variations in sensed-nodes if the sensors do not perfectly distinguish all states. We let C ⊂ DW ⊂ S be the set of
compatible states, and O denote our observation of the sensors.
Q2 (Patient zero detection): Q2 asks about the posterior distribution of initial state after our observation of the
nodes, given a known prior D from which X0 comes from. We can apply Bayes’ Theorem
P(X0 = x|O) =
P(O|X0 = x)P(X0 = x)
P(O)
∝ P(O|X0 = x)P(X0 = x) , (8)
as P(O) is just a constant that ensures
∑
i∈S P(X0 = i|O) = 1. We know P(X0 = x) as the initial distribution D is
known. For P(O|X0 = x), we again consider all states of the detection set of the placed sensors as absorbing, and we
need to sum the probabilities of getting absorbed to exactly those states in the detection set which are compatible with
our observation. Therefore
P(O|X0 = x) =
∑
α∈C
P(X∞ = α|X0 = x) . (9)
The probability of ending in a specific absorbing state starting from a specific transient space can be found with the
fundamental matrix of the Markov Chain.
Q3 (Outbreak time estimation): Q3 asks about the distribution of time since the epidemic began. We denote
P(t = k) the probability of the infection having started exactly k timesteps ago (this is, the process started at t = 0 and
was absorbed at DW at t = k), and to calculate it we start similarly as in Q2:
P(t = k|O) = P(O|t = k)P(t = k)
P(O)
∝ P(O ∩ (t = k)) . (10)
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In the analytical calculation of Q1 we have derived how to calculate the distribution of the hitting time of DW , so this
accounts for the prior distribution {P(t = k)}k∈N. Also similarly as before,
P(O ∩ (t = k)) =
∑
α∈C
P((X∞ = α) ∩ (t = k)) . (11)
P(X∞ = α ∩ t = k) is the probability that absorption to state α happens exactly at time k. This is P(Xk =
α) − P(Xk−1 = α), both conditioned on X0 ∼ D and which can be calculated with powers of the Markov Chain
transition matrix.
Q4 (Current status assessment): Q4 asks generally about the probability distributions of the current state over the
states in DW . This is calculated using the same idea as Q2 and Q3. We denote X the actual state
P(X = x|O) = P(O|X = x)P(X = x)
P(O)
∝ P(O|X = x)P(X = x) = I(x ∈ C)P(X = x) . (12)
P(X = x) is the probability of being absorbed at state x, which is known a priori with the fundamental matrix.
Therefore, we see that the observation just restricts the probability distribution from DW to its subset C. We can now
solve for the probability of node i being in state sl by summing over the posterior probabilities of all states in which i is
in sl.
4.4 Optimal testing (Q5)
We aim to perform those tests that give us maximum information about the state of the network. As with the sensors,
we may model tests as being able to distinguish between some states and unable to distinguish between others. A test
will therefore tell us that a node is part of a subset of the s possible states. Similarly as before, this choice just alters the
set of compatible states.
We use the classical concepts of entropy and mutual information to formalize our objective of gaining maximum




P(X = x|O) logP(X = x|O) . (13)
We aim to perform some test T to a fixed number of nodes, so that after observing the result of them the entropy of X
has decreased the most on average. The average entropy of X after the test to a subset of nodes W ′, TW ′ , which may
take values t1, . . . , tk, with k = d′|W
′| if the test is able to distinguish between d′ groups of states, is:
H(X|O, TW ′) =−
k∑
i=1




P(TW ′ = ti)
∑
x∈S
P(X = x|O, TW ′ = ti) logP(X = x|O, TW ′ = ti) , (14)
and therefore the problem we aim to solve is the maximization of the mutual information
argmax
W ′⊂V
I(X|O;T ) = argmax
W ′⊂V
H(X|O)−H(X|O, TW ′) = argmin
W ′⊂V
H(X|O, TW ′) . (15)
For example, if W ′ = W , and provided that the tests are not more powerful than the sensors, the mutual information
would be zero. This is the logical conclusion that testing the already known nodes is the worst thing one could do, as we
always haveH(X|O) ≥ H(X|O, TW ′). If we perfectly know P (X = x|O), then we are able to evaluate the expression




P(X = x|O, TW ′ = ti) ∝ P(TW ′ = ti|O,X = x)P(X = x|O) = I(x ∈ Ci)P(X = x|O) . (16)
We could now theoretically evaluate the mutual information for all tests to obtain the best one. As in the sensor case,
the brute force approach tries an exponential number of possibilities, and access to an estimator of P(X = x|O), which
12
in turn require an exponential number of roll-outs. Alternatively, one could instead attempt to estimate the marginals of
X (i.e, the probability of each node being in each state after the sensor detection). This only requires a number of runs
scaling roughly as the number of nodes to maintain estimation accuracy. Recall that when we write P(X = x|O), x,
an state of the Markov Chain, actually encapsulates the states of all nodes S1, S2, . . . , Sn, all of which take values in
1, 2, . . . , s. Therefore, for the {si} determined by x we have
P(X = x|O) = P(S1 = s1, S2 = s2, . . . , Sn = sn|O) . (17)
Assuming that we have access to the marginals {P(Si = sj |O)}i,j , what can we say about the information gain? The
marginals do not completely determine the full distribution, and so all the values of information gain depend on the
copula of the n random variables Si. For the simplest copula, which is the assumption that the Si are independent, the
distribution factorizes, so P(S1 = s1, S2 = s2, . . . , Sn = sn|O) =
∏n
i=1 P(Si = si|O) , and if we assume that the
testing process does not destroy this independence this leads to
H(X|O, TW ′) = H((S1, S2, . . . , Sn)|O, TW ′) =
n∑
i=1
H(Si|O, TW ′) =
∑
i∈W ′





where the last equality comes from the fact that a test on W ′ does not change our knowledge of other nodes under this
independence assumption. Now,

















(H(Si|O)−H(Si|O, T{i})) . (19)
This means that we can effectively rank the nodes, with a score equal to H(Si|O)−H(Si|O, T{i}) ≥ 0 and take in W ′
the desired number of elements of the highest score as we want to maximize the mutual information. This result is
fairly intuitive: For example, in a simplified case of just infected and healthy states, if we estimate that a node is healthy
with probability 0.5 and infected with probability 0.5 after the sensor observation and a test could tell whether it is
healthy or infected, it is more beneficial to test it rather than someone else with 0.9 probability of being infected as far
as information of the current state of the pandemic is concerned. This score can also be computed with our available




P(Si = sj |O) logP(Si = sj |O) . (20)
H(Si|O, T{i}) depends on the capacity to distinguish states. If all test outputs completely determine the state of the
node, then H(Si|O, T{i}) = 0 with probability one, since the resulting discrete distribution assigns probability one to
a state and 0 elsewhere. Similarly to the sensor case, the generalized version is considering the s states divided in l
groups, G1, ..., Gl. The test can output l possibilities and the test outputting x, T{i} = x, means that the node is in a















































P(Si = k|O) log
(
P(Si = k|O)∑




This provides a criteria for the best nodes to test next under independence assumptions using only information about
the marginal distributions, which are more feasible to estimate than the whole distribution. Similarly as in Q1, the
analytical solutions for Q2-Q4 rely on being able to operate with matrices of order sn, prohibitively large for just a
moderate amount of nodes, while Q5 requires estimating the marginals. Next section covers algorithms to solve all of
the problems in practise without these unattainable memory requirements.
5 Solving the problem in practice with Monte Carlo sampling
We assume now that we have access to a simulator, this is, a program to obtain samples from the Markov Chain. This
requirement is far weaker than being able to store the exponential-growing transition matrix of the Markov Chain, as
we can simulate one step just by simulating the random processes that each node undergoes to find the next state. For
each run, we simulate the Markov Chain until one of two things happen: We reach a true absorbing state of the Markov
Chain (these do not include the added absorbing states related to sensor placement, but they do include for example all
healthy or all removed in the SIR model), or all the nodes have already been in a detectable state at least once. We
therefore keep track of nodes that have already been in a detectable state in the current run. Algorithm 1 provides an
example of the typical structure of a simulator capable of generating NR runs from a given Markov Chain representing
a specific model.
Algorithm 1: Example of simulator
Input: NR ∈ N, network G of N nodes, initial distribution D, simulator of one step of the model OneStep
Output: NR runs of a specific epidemic model on network G
Runs← [] ;
for i = 1, . . . , NR do
Sample X0 ∼ D ;
CurrentState← X0 ;
CurrentRun← [CurrentState];
detect← zeros(1,n) ; /* Keep track of detected nodes */
while not (CurrentState absorbing or ∀i, detect[i] = 1) do
NextState← OneStep(CurrentState) ;
CurrentRun← CurrentRun ∪ CurrentState ;
CurrentState← NextState ;
for n = 1, . . . , N do
if detect[n] = 0 and n detectable in CurrentState then
detect[n]← 1;
Runs← Runs ∪ CurrentRun
return S
We now revise all problems to explain how to use the simulator to obtain approximate solutions in practice
5.1 Sensor placement optimization (Q1)
We define the optimization objective function over subsets of nodes for a given τ as
f : P(V )→ R
W → P (TDW ≤ τ) ,
so that our objectives become
argmax
W⊂V,|W |=k
f(W ) , or argmin
W⊂V,f(W )≥1−ε
|W | . (22)
5.1.1 Function evaluation
f can be approximated with Monte Carlo samples as follows: Let L be a matrix of shape (NR, n) such that, for every
run i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NR} = [NR]
L[i, j] = min{n ∈ N|Node j is detectable at t = n in run i} , (23)
with L[i, j] =∞ if node j is never detectable in run i. The process of creating and populating this matrix can be done
inside the simulator at no extra cost (In fact, it can be used instead of the detect binary vector). Given this matrix, an
estimator for f , f̂ , can be calculated as follows:
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f̂ : P(V )→ R
W → |i ∈ [NR] s.t mink∈W L[i, k] <= τ |
NR
.
As NR →∞, we have that f̂ → f uniformly, since
1
NR
|i ∈ [NR] s.t min
k∈W
L[i, k] ≤ τ | → P(TDW ≤ τ) (24)
because of the law of large numbers and the domain P(V ) is finite. We therefore approximate f by evaluating f̂ using
all the available Monte Carlo samples.
5.1.2 Optimization of f via submodularity
The combinatorial structure of the problem requires not only a way to rapidly evaluate the objective function but an
optimization scheme that avoids evaluating the exponential number of possible sensor placements. In order to do that,
we exploit the submodularity properties of f and fundamental results about submodular optimization. If Ω is a finite set,
a function h : P(Ω)→ R is called submodular if it satisfies one of these three equivalent conditions
1. ∀X,Y ⊆ Ω with X ⊆ Y and every x ∈ Ω \ Y we have that h(X ∪ {x})− h(X) ≥ h(Y ∪ {x})− h(Y )
2. ∀S, T ⊆ Ω we have that h(S) + h(T ) ≥ h(S ∪ T ) + h(S ∩ T )
3. ∀X ⊆ Ω and x1, x2 ∈ Ω\X such that x1 6= x2, h(X ∪ {x1}) + h(X ∪ {x2}) ≥ h(X ∪ {x1, x2}) + h(X)
We aim to prove that our defined f is non-negative, monotone (i.e that f(X) ≤ f(Y ) for X ⊂ Y ) and submodular.
The non-negativity is trivial from the definition of probability, and monotonicity comes from the fact that for A ⊂ B,
DA ⊂ DB and so the event TDA ≤ τ always implies TDB ≤ τ , so f(A) ≤ f(B). We prove in the Appendix that f is
sub-modular:
Theorem 1. f as defined in this section is a submodular function.
We can now invoke two well-known results in submodular function optimization that will give us guarantees of
greedy-like optimization for the two problems mentioned above, using algorithms 2 and 3 respectively. Both of run in
polynomial time and only require O(n2) evaluations of the objective function.
Theorem 2. (Nemhauser et al., 1978) If f is monotone submodular and non-negative, the greedy scheme in Algorithm
2 applied to the problem argmaxW⊂V,|W |=k f(W ) returns a solution S
′ for which f(S′) ≥ (1− 1e )f(S∗) where S∗ is
the optimal set. [15]
Algorithm 2: Greedy scheme for Q1A
Input: k ∈ N, f function over sets of V
Output: S ⊂ V with |S| = k approximate solution to Q1A
S ← ∅ ;
i← 0 ;
while i ≤ k do
S ← S ∪ argmax
v∈V \S
f(S ∪ {v}) ;
i← i+ 1 ;
return S
Theorem 3. (L. Wolsey, 1982) If f is submodular, the greedy scheme in Algorithm 3 applied to the problem
argminW⊂V,f(W )≥1−ε |W | returns a solution S′ for which
|S′|
|S ∗ | ≤ 1 + log
f(V )− f(∅)
f(S′)− f(S−1)
where S* is the optimal
set and S−1 is the set at the iteration prior to the termination of the algorithm. [16]
15
Algorithm 3: Greedy scheme for Q1B
Input: ε ∈ [0, 1], f function over sets of V
Output: S ⊂ V with f(S) ≥ 1− ε approximate solution to Q1B
S ← ∅ ;
while f(S) < 1− ε do




It is however our case that we are not optimizing f by using evaluations of f itself, but an approximation f̂ . A reasonable
question is whether f̂ has similar properties as f that can guarantee some optimization success. Our next result proves
that, at least optimization wise, optimizing with the greedy scheme with samples of f̂ is not worse than optimizing with
samples of f , as f̂ satisfies the same submodularity, non-negativity and monotonicity conditions.
Theorem 4. The sample approximation of f , f̂ , is non-negative, monotone and submodular for all values of NR
Proof. Non-negativity is true by definition, and monotonoicity comes from the fact that if A ⊂ B, mink∈AL[i, k] ≥
mink∈BL[i, k] and so for an equal number or less of runs the minimum over A will be ≤ τ than the minimum over B,
so f(A) ≤ f(B). For submodularity, we want to see, that for X ⊂ Y and x ∈ V \ Y
f̂(X ∪ {x})− f̂(X) ≥ f̂(Y )− f̂(X ∪ {x}) . (25)
The left hand side is |i ∈ [NR] s.t mink∈X∪{x} L[i, k] <= τ | − |i ∈ [NR] s.t mink∈X L[i, k] <= τ | = |i ∈
[NR] s.t (mink∈X L[i, k] > τ) ∩ (L[i, x] ≤ τ)|. Similarly, the right hand side is |i ∈ [NR] s.t (mink∈Y L[i, k] >
τ) ∩ (L[i, x] ≤ τ)|. As mink∈Y L[i, k] > τ =⇒ mink∈X L[i, k] > τ , there are at least as many elements in the set
of the left hand side than in the set of the right hand side, proving the inequality.
Taking limits in the submodularity inequality for f̂ provides an alternative proof that f is submodular.
5.2 Q2-Q3 implementation
For Q2 and Q3, we are going to use the usual sample estimators for conditioned probability. For both questions, Obsi
refers to the observation our sensors would have observed if the real infection had happened exactly like run i. This can
be obtained with the sequence of states of the run, seeing which one is the first in DW , and may or may not match our
true sensor observation O.
This means that given the runs, the approximate solution for Q2 (Patient zero detection) is that the distribution over
initial states is:
P̂(X0 = x|Obs = O) =
|i s.t Xi0 = x ∩Obsi = O|
|i s.t Obsi = O| . (26)
This will not be a good estimator if the set of initial states is exponential with the number of nodes. As mentioned
before, however, a reasonable assumption is that D is a distribution over nodes about the probabilities of them becoming
patient zero in the infection, so it scales with n. For Q3 (Outbreak time estimation), our empirical distribution of times
depends on the how much time it took for the observed runs which end at Obsi = O to get absorbed in this state:
P̂(t = k|Obs = O) = |i s.t t
i
ABS = k ∩Obsi = O|
|i s.t Obsi = O| . (27)
5.3 Marginal distributions approximation for Q4-Q5
For Q4 (Current status assessment), we do not expect to have sufficient samples to be able to accurately approximate
the exact distribution over the exponential number of states, so we directly focus on approximating the marginal
distributions of nodes {P(Sk = sj |O)}k=1:n,j=1:s. We approximate this by looking at the network just at the time it
produces observation O, and obtaining statistics over node status. Sik is the status of node k at the time of detection of
run i.
P̂(Sk = sj |Obs = O) =
|i s.t Sik = sj ∩Obsi = O|
|i s.t Obsi = O| . (28)
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Using these approximated marginal distributions, one can directly solve Q5 (Optimal testing after detection) under the
independence assumption, as we shown in the previous section how to obtain the mutual information for testing node k









P(Sk = g|O) log
(
P(Sk = g|O)∑
α∈Gj P(Sk = α|O)
)
, (29)
in which we replace all true probabilities P(Sk = sj |O) with our approximates P̂(Sk = sj |O)
6 Experiments
We present two groups of experiments: the first is a small toy example in which all questions have been solved
analytically to illustrate the results that applying the whole framework can have. The second group corresponds to
applying the approximate algorithms explained in Section 5 to two real networks in different situations, acting as a
reasonable use cases for epidemic outbreak detection. A SIR model with β = 0.5, γ = 0.25 is used in all cases.
6.1 Toy example on a small graph
We use the graph with n = 7 nodes and m = 7 edges in Figure 3, and set τ = 3. The sensors that maximize
P (TDW ≤ τ) are nodes 1 and 5 with a value of 0.850 (circled in the figure)
Figure 3: Toy example graph of n = 7 nodes and m = 7 edges. For τ = 3, nodes 1 and 5 are the optimal set of two
sensors
We then run a simulation in which the infection starts from an unknown initial node, and the sensors detect when a node
gets infected. The first time the sectors detect the existence of the epidemic, both nodes 1 and 5 test positive for the
infection. The status of the rest of the network is initially unknown. We calculate the posterior distribution of patient
zero probabilities, which can be seen in figure 4. Note that nodes 0, 1, 5, 6 are given 0 probabilities. Indeed, if 0 or 1
were the initial nodes, the infection would have reached 1 before 5, and so the sensor reading would have not been
simultaneous infection of 1 and 5, and similarly for 5 and 6 and node 5.
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Figure 4: Posterior distribution of patient zero probabilities for the toy example graph given simultaneous observation
in nodes 1 and 5
The posterior distribution of times can be seen in Figure 5. The observation of simultaneous infection of two nodes
discards the possibility of having observed the infection at t = 0
Figure 5: Posterior distribution of time since the infection started for the toy example graph given simultaneous
observation in nodes 1 and 5
Finally, we calculate the marginals for each node and their entropies. In Figure 6, node color represents the entropy of
their marginal distribution, plotted next to each node. We see for example how node 3 has been infected with probability
1. Indeed, if node 1 and 5 get infected simultaneously, this implies that the infection has travelled through 3, as it
appears in the two paths from 1 to 5. There is some probabililty that 3 is not infectious anymore. If we were given tests
to test the network immediately, and these tests were able to distinguish between the the statuses, the gain to obtain the
maximum amount of information is to test node 4 first.
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Figure 6: Marginal distribution of each node belonging to each state and entropy of the distributions for the toy example
graph given simultaneous observation in nodes 1 and 5
6.2 Real networks
We test the approximate algorithms in two real networks which can act as reasonable cases of interest in epidemic
tracing.
6.2.1 US air transportation network
We use the US air transportation network [17], in which we preemptively want to place sensors able to detect if a node
is infected. These can be interpreted as a continuous monitorization of passengers in specific airports. This network has
n = 332 and m = 2126, far beyond the range of analytical calculations. A similar analysis as in the toy example is
performed, with τ = 3 but in this case NR = 106 runs are performed and k = 10 sensors are placed according to the
greedy scheme in Algorithm 2. The obtained solution can be seen in Figure 7, where the number before each selected
airport is the order of choice in the greedy scheme. Their approximate probability of detecting the infection in lesser or
equal than 3 steps is 0.93. In comparison, the mean probability of a sample of 105 random sensor placement is 0.82,
and its maximum is still below the greedy solution at 0.89.
Figure 7: Overview of the US air transportation graph, with 10 sensor placement obtained using Algorithm 2 and a
sample approximation of the objective function with 106 runs. The number before the airport name indicates the order
of placement by the greedy algorithm
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Now, similarly as in the previous case, an infection is simulated starting from a theoretically unknown node (in this
case, it was Fayetteville in North Carolina, but the algorithm can not use that information) until the sensors are infected.
In this case, the observation can be seen in Figure 8, where infected sensed nodes appear in red and healthy sensed
nodes appear in green.
Figure 8: State of the epidemic observed by the sensors in the k = 10 nodes selected. Sensors are able to detect if a
node is healthy (green) or infected (red)
We perform the approximate inference of the posterior distribution of patient zero probabilities, the results of which can
be found in Figure 9, in which node size is proportional to its probability.
Figure 9: Probability distribution of being patient zero, after the detection in Figure 8 is taken into account. Node size
is proportional to probability
The posterior results for time since initial infection can be found in Figure 10. The probability of t > 2 is small and the
probability of t > 4 is almost 0.
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Figure 10: Probability distribution of time since infection, after the detection in Figure 8 is taken into account.
Finally, we estimate the marginals, a histogram of which can be seen in figure 11. This clearly shows that we have
detected the infection in its early stage.
Figure 11: Histogram of the marginal distributions of each node, giving us a quick overview on the current status of the
network after the detection in Figure 8. We see that most of the network is still likely healthy.
Finally, in Table 1 we can find the top nodes to test next based on entropy of the current estimated marginal distributions.
As expected, the top airports are highly connected but non sensed airports
Airport Susceptible probability Infected probability Removed probability Entropy (bits)
Charlotte 0.447 0.504 0.049 1.230
Pittsburgh 0.478 0.500 0.022 1.131
Atlanta 0.456 0.522 0.022 1.128
Denver 0.460 0.522 0.018 1.108
Newark 0.500 0.487 0.013 1.088
Table 1: Top 5 highest entropy nodes after detection in Figure 8. If the tests are able to distinguish between all states,
then these (in order) are the optimal nodes to test next if we want the maximum information gain about the network
6.2.2 Hypertext 2009
We perform a second experiment of another situation in a real human interaction dataset. We use the Hypertext 2009
network [18], a human interaction network. The ACM Conference on Hypertext and Hypermedia 2009 was held
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in Turin, Italy in 2009, and during the conference, the participation badges included Radio-Frequency Identification
devices embedded in conference badges that were able to mine face-to-face proximity relations [19]. The exchange of
radio packets between badges implies a proximity of less than 1-1.5 m, a distance in which epidemics could spread. In
the network, a node represents a conference visitor, and an edge represents a face-to-face contact that was active for at
least 20 seconds. The network has n = 113 nodes and m = 2196 edges once we aggregate edges over time.
The flexibility of our framework allows us to also model a situation in which the sensors are not placed beforehand and
we detect the epidemic late. The scenario here would be the following: a new epidemic arises, able to go unnoticed to
general tests. We observe that someone dies at some point in time and the new infection is discovered as the cause of
their death. What can a dataset of social interaction and tracing tell us about the state of the disease in the population?
How likely is that the first person who died was the first person to contract the disease? What is the probability of
infection of each node?
This small network plays the role of a dataset of social tracing that could be obtained nowadays with mobile phones, for
example. The way to simulate this scenario in our model is to jump straight to the a posteriori questions, assuming that
we have sensors placed in all nodes but they can only detect once someone is removed. Figure 12 shows the topology
of the network, with the detected removed node marked in red.
Figure 12: Topology of the Hypertext 2009 network, which has n = 113 nodes representing attendees to the conference
and m = 2196 edges representing social interactions between attendees. The node that was first removed due the
epidemic is marked in red
In figure 13, we see the results of the approximate inference of patient zero. We see that the probability of the removed
node being patient zero is roughly 0.4, while the rest of nodes with positive probabilities have probabilities smaller than
or around 0.05, with one exception. A highly disconnected node, appearing in the bottom right, is given an unusual
high probability of around 0.2. This is because this node is only connected to the removed node, and so, if the infection
actually started there, with very high probability itself or the true removed node would be the first deaths.
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Figure 13: Approximate inference of patient 0 of the disease, with node color and size depending on the probability.
The first removed node is patient zero with a probability of around 0.4
As for the time distribution, shown in Figure 14, the most relevant fact is that due to high δ it is unlikely that the
infection has been going on for > 2 timesteps and that the 0 probability assigned to t = 0 comes in this case not because
simultaneity but because the sensors sense the removed and not the infected state.
Figure 14: Posterior distribution of time since infection for the Hypertext2009 network
Finally, the most important question in this hypothetical situation would be the assessment of the current status of
the network via marginal estimation. Due to high β and high connectivity of the removed node, we expect these
probabilities to be quite high, and in fact, in figure 15 we see how clearly the probability depends on the graph distance
from the removed node, with all the people that have socially interacted with the removed node having an infection
probability around 0.6− 0.7 and the people which didn’t interact directly with the removed node (all of which are at
distance 2 to the removed node) have a far lower probability of around 0.2 − 0.3. Comparing it with the histogram
of the US air transportation dataset, we clearly see that in this case we have detected the infection much later, as the
majority of the network is likely infected in this case.
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Figure 15: Histogram of infection probabilities separated by distance to the removed node
Similar as in the other example, we could calculate the entropies to decide further testing. Since we know that all
testable nodes are not removed, the entropy is just a measure of how close the probability of infection is to 0.5. We can
see from the graph that the first node to test would be the neighbor with lowest probability of infection.
7 Conclusions
In this work we have introduced a framework that uses the language of Markov Chains to solve problems in early
detection of epidemics. Most importantly, the framework is model agnostic as long as the model can be expressed as a
Markov Chain, which as commented is a weak assumption. Being able to model the sensors as well provides a huge
flexibility and the same framework can be used to answer different questions. For the sensor placement problem, we
have proved a submodularity result for a coverage-like function related to the cumulative density function of hitting
times for any Markov Chain, which then can be used in this case as a guarantee that a greedy scheme achieves a constant
bound approximation error with a quadratic number of function evaluations. After the sensor placement, we have
used Bayesian inference algorithms to answer questions about the present status of the network and the origin of the
epidemic. Finally, we propose a method to evaluate which tests to do next based on the estimation of the marginal
distributions and the information gain of tests. The Monte Carlo algorithms proposed can then be used to scale to
bigger graphs. We then have used the approximate algorithms in real networks to exemplify the type of insights that
this framework can provide in real life scenarios, in one example in which we have previously prepared for an infection
and one in which we have not.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1. Let S be a finite set and consider M a Markov Chain over the states of S. Then, for τ ∈ R+ the function
h : P(S)→ [0, 1] ⊂ R
W → P (TW ≤ τ)
is submodular.
Note that this is different than f defined above in that the domain set is the power set of states and not the power set of
vertices mapped to the power set of states via D.
Proof. We want to see that for X ⊂ Y and x ∈ S \ Y
P(TX∪{x} ≤ τ)− P(TX ≤ τ) ≥ P(TY ∪{x} ≤ τ)− P(TY ≤ τ) (30)
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We define a path as a sequence of Markov Chain states X0, X1, .... We only need to consider paths of length τ as all the
events are independent of the state of the Markov Chain for t > τ . We have








P(X1 = xi|X0 = xi−1) (31)
The probability of the absorbing time to Z ⊂ S being smaller or equal than τ is equal to the sum of probabilities of
those paths that have an element of Z in their first τ elements after the initial state. This means that P(TX∪{x} ≤
τ)− P(TX ≤ τ) is the sum of probabilities of those paths that contain {x} but do not contain any element in X, and
likewise P(TY ∪{x} ≤ τ)− P(TY ≤ τ) is the sum of probabilities of those paths that contain {x} but do not contain
any element in Y. Since X ⊂ Y the second set is contained in the first, and so in the left hand side we are adding up the
probabilities of at least the same paths than in the right hand side, and hence the inequality holds.
The second part of the submodularity proof for f concerns being able to conserve the submodularity of h under
composition with functions of certain properties.
Lemma 2. (Conservation of submodularity under pullback). Let V, S be finite sets, and let h : P(S)→ R be monotone
submodular. Let g : P(V )→ P(S) be a function satisfying g(A∪B) = g(A)∪ g(B) and A ⊂ B =⇒ g(A) ⊂ g(B)
for A, B ⊂ V . Then, h ◦ g : P(V )→ R is monotone submodular.
(Note that by g(A) we do not mean {g(x)|x ∈ A} but rather the image of g of A as an element g({A}), but we omit the
brackets. A is a subset of V but an element of P(V), and therefore g sends it to a subset of S, element of P(S))
Figure 16 provides a scheme of the situation, in which we have used the explicit notation.
Figure 16: Situation of Lema 2. We want to see that given that h is monotone submodular and g satisfies certain
conditions, the submodularity is conserved under the composition h ◦ g
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Proof. The monotonicity of h ◦ g comes from the monotonicity of h and g. For the submodularity, we want to see that
for all S, T ⊂ V ,
(h ◦ g)(S) + (h ◦ g)(T ) ≥ (h ◦ g)(S ∪ T ) + (h ◦ g)(S ∩ T )
h(g(S)) + h(g(T )) ≥ h(g(S ∪ T )) + h(g(S ∩ T ))
h(g(S)) + h(g(T )) ≥ h(g(S) ∪ g(T ))) + h(g(S ∩ T ))
Since h is submodular and g(S) and g(T ) are subsets of S, we know that
h(g(S)) + h(g(T )) ≥ h(g(S) ∪ g(T ))) + h(g(S) ∩ g(T ))
But since g is monotonous we have g(S∩T ) ⊂ (g(S)∩g(T )) and since h is monotonous h(g(S∩T )) ≤ h(g(S)∩g(T ))
and so we have h(g(S)) + h(g(T )) ≥ h(g(S) ∪ g(T ))) + h(g(S ∩ T ))
Proof of Theorem 1: We apply Lemma 2 to the composition h◦D, whereD is the detection set functionD : P(V)→
P(S) mapping W to DW , where V is the set of vertices in the graph and S the set of Markov Chain states. By Lemma
1 h is submodular and it is also clearly monotonous by the same argument that we have shown that f is monotonous.
By definition of the detection set function D, DA ⊂ DB if A ⊂ B and DA∪B = DA ∪DB . Therefore, f = h ◦D is
submodular. .
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